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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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April 29, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. L. Paul Bremer, III Executive Secretary Department of State

Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Meehan Assistant for Interagency Matters Office of the Secretary of Defense

Mr. William Schneider
Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

Mr. Thomas B. Cormack Executive Secretary () Central Intelligence Agency

Colonel Charles F. Stebbins
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Gtaff

Mr. Joseph Presel Executive Assistant Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT:

Meeting on START -- Friday, April 30, 4:00 P.M.

The meeting scheduled for Friday, April 30, at 10:00 a.m. in the White House Situation Room on the subject of START has been changed to Friday, April 30, at 4:00 p.m. Agencies should be represented by agency heads plus one.

As agreed at today's meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, the attached items are provided for discussion at the above meeting: (1) a chart outlining agency views on a U.S. Negotiation Position and (2) a summary of negotiations criteria.

Michael O. While / san de

Michael O. Wheeler Staff Secretary

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Review April 28, 2002

Classified and Extended by William P. Clark

Reason Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

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AGENCY VIEWS ON START NEGOTIATION POSITION (U)

	AREAS OF POTENTIAL CONSTRAINT:								
ACTUCY	BALLISTIC	ICBM	THROWWE	DELIVERY VEHICLES					
AGENCY	MISSILE WARHEADS	WARHEADS	DIRECT	ALTERNATIVE	MISSILE LAUNCHER	BOMBERS			
OSD	4000		Equal limit at less than current US level	Ю	NO	Equal numbers			
ACDA	4000	2500	Ю	Limit reentry vehicle weight. Limit missile throwweight to twice reentry vehicle weight. Use effects of reduced missile warhead numbers to impact throwweight.	NO	250			
STATE	5000	2500	NO	Ban SS-18 (possibly forego M-X). Use effects of reduced missile warhead numbers to impact throwweight.		tal with ber sub-			
NEGOTIATOR	5000	2500	Equal limit at less than current US level	NO	NO	250			
JCS	Reduction to equal levels			0	Reduction to equal levels	Equal numbers			

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START NEGOTIATIONS CRITERIA

BER SERVER

The following criteria are those which must guide formulation of a position for START:

- o Military capability. A START agreement must permit the U.S. to develop and possess sufficient military capability, taking into account that allowed to the Soviet Union, to deter the Soviet Union and to execute the U.S. national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success.
- o Equality. Nothing less than equality is acceptable in the provisions of any future strategic arms limitation agreement for military reasons and for political/perceptual reasons.
- o Strategic stability. A START agreement must promete stability by reducing the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces. Significant constraints on the most threatening () Soviet systems ICBMs could contribute to this goal.
- o Effective verification. A START agreement must provide for necessary counting rules, collateral constraints, and cooperative measures required to achieve this object, e.
- o Substantial reductions on each side. Whatever unit of measurement is adopted should lend itself to substantial reductions below current levels of forces. Reductions should be to equal ceilings.
- o Easily understood. To gain support and hence underscore the credibility of the U.S. negotiating position, the approach we choose should be explainable in clear and simple terms.
- o Alliance impact. A START agreement should take into account Allied concerns: the ability of the U.S. to maintain a credible deterrent, the relationship of the START approach to the INF negotiations, and the likelihood of success.
- o Anticipated Soviet reaction. The Soviets will undoubtedly resist any of the reductions proposals now being considered. We should concern curselves with how defensible the proposal is against Soviet propaganda efforts.

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